

Fraudsters and eCommerce: A complicated relationship

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Agenda

1. Fraudsters favourite place to work
2. Fraudsters habits
3. The problem in figures:
 - Worldwide
 - Italy
 - UK
 - Brasil
 - China
4. Market approach

Taking a coffe...



1

The fraudster sits in a coffee shop using his or her laptop to create a Wi-Fi hub that's identically named to the venue's legitimate Wi-Fi hotspot.




2

Coffee shop customers log onto the fraudster's hotspot, which contains malware that allows the fraudster to access their machine whilst he is sitting at a nearby table.



3

The fraudster accesses the customer's online accounts whilst sipping a latte at the same time hacking their password using fraudster cryptography tools such as Cain & Abel.



4

Customer leaves the coffee shop and fraudster moves onto his next victim all the while amassing access to online accounts for online banking, online retail and social media ready for exploitation. And of course, this isn't just done in coffee shops but also shopping malls, on trains, in bars, libraries, airports...

"I use a mixture of hi-tech and old school tricks to steal identities. In the summer I likes to get out for a stroll and lift bank statements from hi-density housing postboxes but the coffee shop routine gives me richer data and deeper access to my victim's financial identity."

Convicted Fraudster

The local government census: The fraudster always knocks twice



1

Fraudster selects a neighbourhood or series of streets to target and begins to build the confidence trick by putting leaflets through letterboxes the day before to advertise the census and give his gang an air of legitimacy.

“We would teach them which houses on a street to target and which ones not to bother with. Basically the ones with nice cars we would go for and the ones with the crappy old banger on the drive we would avoid as that was a good tell for what they had in the bank”


Convicted Fraudster



2

The fraudster's gang work in teams and canvas a street. Hand-picked to match the demographic of the neighbourhood, dressed in suits, with badges and letterheads to announce their (bogus) credentials, they figure on a one in four success rate for harvesting name, address, date of birth length of tenancy, email address and other data-points they need to commit fraud.

The local government census: The fraudster always knocks twice



The Master

Owns, uses or sells the identities on carder forums. Has a handful of trusted fraudsters who serve as his captains in this exploit and play roles in the actual usage of the identities.

The Captains

Recruit, brief, and manage the soldiers. Captains, AKA the 10% man, get paid a percentage of their Master's frauds.

The Soldiers

Get paid £5 or \$10 for every identity they obtain.

Social media techniques: My virtual friend, the real life fraudster



1

Fraudster befriends "Brian" on a social network.



2

Fraudster checks out "Brian's" connections and friends and selects the ones that he wants to target based on how much info they display about themselves.



3

Fraudster creates a new account for "Brian" and reaches out to the targeted connections impersonating "Brian" claiming he has lost access to his social media account and has been forced to create a new account.



4

The fraudulent "Brian" can now see all of the target connection's posts, history, likes, job titles, employers, venues, educational achievements, hobbies, where they live and really understand who they are and how they spend their time and money.

"My favourite targets on social media tend to be people born between 1960 and 1975. They are into social media enough to have a decent amount of data on their wall or profile but are not Internet savvy enough to protect themselves.

Plus they are the perfect age to still have a good credit history and line of credit, still be economically active and also to be time-poor which makes it easier for me to con them."

Convicted Fraudster

The loyalty discount offer: If it looks too good to be true...



1

Fraudster calls his "target" from the phone book.

"Hi Mr Smith, we would like to offer our loyalty cardholders a discount on their next few shops"

"How much is the discount?"

2

Fraudster engages their target by masquerading as a major supermarket.

"Mr Smith, we would like to offer our loyalty card holders 50% off their next three shops. All we need from you today is a card payment of £33/\$33 and we will send you vouchers so you only pay half of your total shop value at checkout."

"What even if my basket is worth a few hundred?"

"Yes Mr Smith, it's a special promotional offer we're testing for a small group of customers"

3

Fraudster makes their target "an offer they can't refuse". The fraudster promises unfeasibly attractive discounts off future purchases in return for a small cash payment taken via the card. The fraudster then obtains the card number and necessary details to go on to do fraud with their target's identity.

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
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Many roles....



Where are going all these data?

WorldWide CVV Service + UK Bank Logins

Hello guys .

In stock more then 25 countys.

Most intresting cvv2:

CA - Many Good Bins in Stock - 3-4\$ each . By bins 5-6

AU - 80-90% valid of my au cards make happy for use!

US - more then 10k visa+mc and 10k amex of 80-90%

UK - fresh 8k cards in stock for u . 454742 - 10\$ each v

Gold/Plat bins 6-7\$ / . Random cvv2 - 5\$.

EU - more then 3k stock of eu cards - 7-9\$ per one .

DE - good germany mc cvvs of 90-95% valid - 8\$ each.

ASia (TH,JP,CN,TW) - 6\$

Special Offers:

(100 CA - 200\$) [100 UK - 350\$] (100 EU - 480\$) [100 .

Insane user behaviour....




[@NeedADebitCard](#)


The screenshot shows a Twitter thread on the 'Home' page. The top tweet is a retweet of a tweet from user 'bae' (@[redacted]) posted 9 hours ago. The tweet text is: 'the back code of my card is 388 why is everyone asking? smh'. It has 703 retweets and 208 likes. The second tweet is also a retweet of the same user 'bae', posted 9 hours ago. The text is: 'Finally got my debit card! Love the blue 🙌💙'. Below the text is a photograph of a blue Visa debit card with the card number 4060 6860 1171 2127 and the expiration date 03/17. This tweet has 753 retweets and 228 likes. At the bottom of the screenshot, there is a tweet from 'bae' (@[redacted]) posted 20 hours ago. The text is: 'Had to cancel my old debit card. Apparently someone else was using it. Whatever this one is cute too! 🥰❤️! pic.twitter.com/8KZxAULISq'. Below this text is a photograph of an HSBC Visa debit card with a red and white Indian map graphic and the number 4659 3338. The bottom navigation bar of the Twitter app is visible, showing icons for Timelines, Notifications, Messages, and Me.

Fraudsters working time


Normal People Take Lunch Breaks



Fraudsters Go Hungry



Fraudsters working time




Where are they from?




Fraudsters Multiple Identity

Fraudsters Don Multiple Identities



Fraudsters Are Sneaky



In figures: World Wide

Every year

12 BIL \$

are lost because online frauds

1 %

is the average fraud rate for
ecommerce

25 %

of total ecommerce orders are
reviewed manually

In figures: Italy



180M €

Loss on eCommerce revenues in Italy 2014

1 %

is the average fraud rate for
ecommerce

2.15 M

of fraudolents order in Italy
2014

In figures: UK eCommerce



102 Bil \$

eCommerce revenues in 2013

16.3 %

eCommerce Growth
In 2013

88.5 %

Credit/debit card

7.7 %

PayPal

In figures: UK eCommerce Fraud



1.68 Bil \$

Loss on eCommerce revenues in 2013

1.65 %

average fraud rate

85 %

of merchants expect
fraud revenue loses
to remain Static or Grow

In figures: Brasil eCommerce



30.5 Bil \$

eCommerce revenues in 2013

28 %

eCommerce Growth
In 2013

71 %

Credit/debit card

10 %

Boletos Bancario

In figures: Brasil eCommerce Fraud



427 Mil \$ (1.4%)

Loss on eCommerce revenues in 2013

85 %

of merchants conduct
manual review
and they review
35% of the orders

8.2 %

of orders are rejected due to
suspicion of fraud

64 %

of manually reviewed
orders are ultimately
accepted

In figures: China eCommerce



193 Bil \$

eCommerce revenues in 2013

78.5%

eCommerce Growth
in 2013

270 mil.

of Digital Buyers
in 2013

In figures: China eCommerce Fraud



5 Bil \$

Loss on eCommerce revenues in 2013

6%

Cash on delivery

29%

eWallets (Alipay, PayPal)

26%

Online bank transfer

33%

Credit/debit card

Market Approach

RULES APPROACH

- ✗ Some fraud blocked, some **allowed** through
- ✗ **False positive:** “Defensive” posture means much business lost
- ✗ Huge costs for **manual reviews**
- ✗ **Slow:** reviews can take hours, cost business
- ✗ High price for **costs incurred**, business lost


ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

- ✓ **Network Protection Effect:** All ecommerce are protected simultaneously
- ✓ **Real Time:** instant decision in 0.5 sec.
- ✓ **False Positive:** only fraud transactions are blocked
- ✓ **EU Privacy Compliance**
- ✓ **Scalable** for high transactions volume



BEHAVIORAL BIOMETRICS

- ⊘ **Privacy Compliance:** not all clients are likely to give biometrics data
- ⊘ **Slow:** build a complete “biometrics profile” takes more than 30 purchases on the same website
- ⊘ **Not scalable** for high transactions volume
- ⊘ **Decrease ecommerce conversion** due step to biometrics authentication



Sources:

Bank of Mexico, Latin America B2C eCommerce Report, Ystats, 2013,
eMarketers
Alipay
Cybersource
Unfraud
Siftscience
Global Survey of Online Shoppers, PwC, 2013
Paypal
Telegraph
Jumio

Write me! It is free...



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